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llied cryptographic efforts had continued to progress
from 1940 when the first German Enigma codes were penetrated, and
after the formation of Ultra in 1943, more and more information
became available. By the time that Count von Stauffenberg’s bomb
nearly killed Adolf Hitler in mid-1944, Ultra periodically
obtained accurate information on the Führer’s
itinerary.
Some discussion took place in Allied quarters about the feasibility of
eliminating this madman, but Winston Churchill objected, believing that
such an action could turn Hitler into a German martyr. “Besides,” he
concluded, “with Hitler dead the conduct of the war might return to the
hands of his professional generals” (Breuer, b, 70).
While recuperating from wounds suffered during the
failed coup, Hitler was bedridden for several weeks and had time to think,
or more accurately, stew.
Increasingly paranoid and addicted to medication,
Hitler decided that Germany should get out of its defensive posture. In
early September he called in two of his closest and still-trusted
advisors, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the German High Command,
and Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl, Chief of Staff. Oblivious to circumstances,
Hitler proclaimed: “We must regain the initiative; I have spoken.” (Merriam, 3)
The Nazis had approximately 30 divisions
that could be used for an offensive, a dozen of which were battle-hardened
Panzer outfits. Also included were some of the Volksgrenadier divisions, made up of recently-drafted German males of various ages,
were numerous rear-echelon military personnel from all branches of the
service, plus others who lacked equipment to perform their normal duties,
including pilots and sailors. The latter were given infantry training and formed
around regular army officers.
An offensive in the east had been
ruled out immediately by Hitler. The Soviets had approximately 150 divisions by now and before
long the Russian winter would again dominate the Eastern Front. However,
the Allies
on the Western Front had no more than 50 divisions by September
and by then it was obvious to the Germans that Allied supply lines were at
the breaking point. The Western Allies, in particular the Americans,
vested much of their combat capacity in their air forces.
After MARKET-GARDEN, the German high command
correctly deduced that the Allied assault in the west would next target the ancient German city of Aachen, 50 airline miles SSE of Eindhoven, in a
move toward the Rhine and into the Ruhr, the industrial heart of the
German war effort. In his more optimistic moments Hitler believed that he
could seal off the Allied salient at Aachen and trap approximately 20
Allied divisions. He was convinced that the Allied coalition was fragile
in that it contained such contradictory elements as capitalist, communist,
former colonizer and former colony. In particular, Hitler thought that if
England and America were subjected to sudden, massive losses, their will to
persevere, which he believed to be weak in a democracy, would collapse.
Even if this did not occur, however, Hitler believed
that such an offensive would buy him the time he needed to get his jets
established, which were already now in production and flying in small
numbers. In fact, though Allied air superiority had nearly removed the
possibility of initiative from German planning, German industry showed
remarkable vitality. Production of aircraft, artillery and tanks had been
moved underground and increased dramatically during 1944 (Gavin, 208).
The Germans had not yet compensated for the shortages of petroleum
products from bombed refiners and related facilities
however, and much of their work now concentrated on special weapons
development such as rockets, jet fighters, long-range jet bombers and the
atomic bomb (Merriam, 5f).
Finally, Hitler believed that in the chaos created among the Allied leadership by such a bold German
offensive, a fatal delay by the Allies was a real possibility while conferences were
held and compromises hammered out. Moreover, probably based on his own experience as
the consummate military meddler, Hitler was certain that Eisenhower lacked
the authority to respond quickly to such an emergency. Here, he guessed
wrong.
See next, The Ardennes
Offensive, Part II: Clues and
Miscues.
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